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RECENT DECISIONS
dened defendant with the duty to see to it that plaintiff was not
insulted by defendant or its employees.
An examination of cases of this type wherein plaintiff failed to
obtain relief because special damages were not shown bears out the
soundness of the distinction drawn in the principal case.' 3 It would
seem that the decision in the principal case was based upon the
peculiar manner in which plaintiff presented her case, which resulted
in a prompt judgment against her upon her amended petition and her
counsel's opening statement to the jury. It appears that her failure
to allege, as particularly contributing to her injuries, the fact that
others heard defendant's remarks, prevented her from being allowed
recovery on the authority of those cases which have awarded damages
for such injuries intentionally caused by defendant's publishing of
falsehoods, falling short of libel or slander, on the theory of an
"action on the case." 14
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
in the principal case is sound, in view of the prevailing policy of the
law of torts, viz.: not to attempt to grant relief in any and all in-
stances where one is maliciously put upon by his neighbor. That
this does not correspond with the perfectionist's ideal is clear, but
weighty arguments against the latter are found in the evanescence
of damages and the possibility of fraud in connection with the bring-
ing of such actions.
R. C. D.
TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-REPRINTING OF LIBELOUS MAT-
TER HELD NOT TO BE REPUBLICATION OF THE LIBEL.--This is a libel
action brought by respondent based upon alleged defamatory state-
ment appearing in a book ' published by the appellants in November,
1941. Subsequent to this initial printing, there were seven addi-
tional printings, the last of which was distributed during a period
beginning March, 1944. Sixty copies of the aforementioned book
193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (1908), reversing 119 App. Div. 808, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 876 (1st Dep't 1907).
23 Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P. 2d 330 (1943); People's
Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413, 82 P. 2d 994 (1938); Maze
v. Employees' Loan Soc. et al., 217 Ala. 44, 114 So. 574 (1927); Republic
Iron & Steel Co. v. Self, 192 Ala. 403, 68 So. 328, L. R. A. 1915F, 516 (1915) ;
Beck v. Luers, - Iowa -, 126 N. W. 811 (1910); Braun v. Craven, 175 IIl.
401, 51 N. E. 657, 42 L. R. A. 199 (1898); Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y.
54, 72 Am. Dec. 420 (1858).
24 Musso v Miller, 265 App. Div. 57, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (3d Dep't 1942)
(see citations therein).
2 "Total Espionage," G. P. Putnam's Sons, Books, Inc. (1941).
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were sold during the year immediately preceding July 2, 1946, on
which date the present action was commenced. It is these copies
which respondent declares subjected him to actionable libel. The
trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the alleged
cause of action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. 2
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 3 re-
versed that decision, holding that each sale of a libelous book, as
distinguished from newspapers and magazines, constitutes a new
cause of action not barred by the statute of limitations, although the
printing was done and most of the sales were made more than one
year prior to the commencement of the action. Held, judgment re-
versed. Sales from stock by a book publisher of copies of a book
containing libelous matter, which are from an impression made and
released for wholesale distribution more than a year before, are not
republications of the libel giving rise to new causes of action within
the meaning of the statute of limitations. ..Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948).
At common law, in cases of this nature, the recognized rule was
that each new display of libelous material constituted a separate cause
of action.4  This rule of extreme liability was adhered to in New
York until the decision in the case of Wolf son v. Syracuse News-
papers, Inc.5 This decision qualified the common law by setting forth
what is known as the single publication rule, which holds that the
publication of a libelous statement in a single issue of a magazine or
newspaper, although such publication consists of thousands of copies,
is one publication giving rise to one cause of action, and that the
statute of limitations runs from the date of that publication. Adjudi-
cated cases of other jurisdictions 6 demonstrate a tendency toward
adoption of this single publication rule. However, this adoption has
not been complete, for the record reveals that in recent decisions the
courts of federal jurisdiction 7 continue to comply with the common
law rule as set down in the Duke of Brunswick case.8
2 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 51, subd. 3.
3 Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 272 App. Div. 591, 74 N. Y. Supp.
238 (1st Dep't 1947).
4 Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849),
where the court held that the evidence of a sale and delivery by the defendant
to the plaintiff's agent of a single copy of the newspaper containing the libel,
seventeen years after the date of its issue, but within the statutory period of
six years before the action was commenced, was in law a new publication
against which the statute of limitations had not run.
5254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938).
6 Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Il1. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708 (1948); Age-
Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907).
7 Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E. D. Wash. 1943);
O'Reilly v. Curtiss Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. C. Mass. 1940).
8 See note 4 Supra.
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Hitherto, the New York courts had not extended the rule of
single publication so as to apply it to books, but had restricted its
application to newspapers and magazines. The decision in the pres-
ent case so extends the rule and sweeps aside the reluctance shown
by the courts in the past to erase the distinction which existed be-
tween magazines and newspapers on the one hand, and books on the
other, in their treatment of the subject matter of libel actions. The
logic underlying this former distinction is that newspapers and
periodicals are generally discarded soon after their publication and
are seldom read thereafter, so that the damage likely to be suffered
therefrom is negligible. Books, however, are not designed to be read
merely during the period immediately following their first publication.
Some books retain their popularity for many years, so that one con-
taining libelous statements would continue to damage the person so
libeled as long as copies are sold. This reasoning, however persua-
sive, when followed seems to defeat the clear purpose of the statute
of limitations, which is to outlaw stale claims and eliminate multi-
plicity of litigation. As a result of such reasoning, a book which had
been published twenty years ago might become the basis of a libel
action today, if perchance the publisher permitted a single copy to
be sold to the public. On the other hand, the extended single pub-
lication rule gives to the statute of limitations the effect which the
legislature seems to have intended.9
As a result of this decision, the present state of the law in New
York is that a libel is reiterated only when an independent act,
equivalent to a new publication in the trade sense, is committed.
The mere continued dissemination of copies of the defamatory matter
originally published is not a reiteration of the libel.
G. T. M.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PROX MATE CAUSE-WHEN IT BECOMES
A QUESTION OF LAw FOR THE CouRT.-Plaintiff, an elderly woman,
emerged from a coffee shop through a revolving door opening upon
a small vestibule. The floor of the vestibule slopes almost imper-
ceptibly toward the sidewalk where it meets a stepdown of about six
inches. After emerging from the revolving door and before stepping
upon the sidewalk, the plaintiff fell and broke her hip. The floor
was not slippery, nor did it contain any foreign substance which
might have caused her fall. The court directed a verdict for the
defendant because the plaintiff failed to show that the condition of
9 Chase Securities Corp'n v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 89 L. ed. 1628
(1945)., Here the court said that the purposes of the statute of limitation
are "to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from
being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost."
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